Volition and the Function of Consciousness by Lau, Hakwan
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 26 Issue 5 Article 6 
12-1-2009 
Volition and the Function of Consciousness 
Hakwan Lau 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Lau, Hakwan (2009) "Volition and the Function of Consciousness," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the 
Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 26 : Iss. 5 , Article 6. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol26/iss5/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative 
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 26 No. 5 Special Issue 2009 537
All rights reserved
VOLITION AND  
THE FUNCTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS
Hakwan Lau
People have intuitively assumed that many acts of volition are not influenced 
by unconscious information. However, the available evidence suggests that 
under suitable conditions, unconscious information can influence behavior 
and the underlying neural mechanisms. One possibility is that stimuli that are 
consciously perceived tend to yield strong signals in the brain, and this makes 
us think that consciousness has the function of sending such strong signals. 
However, if we could create conditions where the stimuli could produce strong 
signals but not the conscious experience of perception, perhaps we would find 
that such stimuli are just as effective in influencing volitional behavior.
Introduction
Many acts of volition seem to require conscious effort. We consciously 
initiate spontaneous motor movements. We cancel planned actions at will. 
We deliberately avoid particular actions. We intentionally shift our action 
plans in order to pursue different goals. Sometimes, theorists say, these 
are the functions of consciousness, as if evolution has equipped us with 
the gift of consciousness just to perform these acts. Without conscious-
ness, presumably, we would only be able to perform much simpler actions 
that are no more sophisticated than embellished reflexes.
In this paper I will review available evidence to see if these intuitive 
claims are empirically supported. Recent studies in cognitive neurosci-
ence suggest that many of these complex processes can actually be per-
formed without consciousness. Or at least, many of them can be directly 
influenced by unconscious information. This calls into question what is 
the true function of consciousness, if not to enable us to deliberate over 
our actions. I will end by discussing what is logically required for an ex-
periment to demonstrate the true function of consciousness.
1. Spontaneous Motor Initiation
Motor actions that are made not in immediate or direct response to exter-
nal stimuli can be said to be spontaneously initiated. These are also some-
times called self-paced or self-generated actions. For instance, one may 
choose to casually flex one’s wrist while sitting in a dark room, out of one’s 
own free choice and timing, not to react to anything in particular. Some 
philosophers have argued that in cases like that, it should seem obvious 
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that the action is caused by one’s conscious intention.1 Whereas one may 
argue that fast reactions to external stimuli may be driven by unconscious 
reflex (e.g., a runner leaping forward upon hearing the starting whistle), 
spontaneous actions do not seem to have any immediate cause but the 
conscious intention itself.
However, it has been shown that there is preparatory activity in the 
brain that starts at as early as 1–2 seconds before spontaneous actions are 
executed. This piece of one of the most perplexing findings in cognitive 
neuroscience was originally reported by Kornhuber and Deecke in the 
1960s.2 They placed electrodes on the scalp to measure electroencephalog-
raphy (EEG) while subjects made spontaneous movements at their own 
timing. The EEG data that were time-locked to the point of motor execu-
tion (as measured by muscle contraction indicated by electromyography, 
EMG) were averaged over many trials, which produced an event-related 
potential (ERP) known as the bereitschaftspotential (BP) or readiness po-
tential (RP). The readiness potential is slowly rising, peaking at around 
the point of action execution and starting from 1–2 seconds before that 
(see Fig. 1). The readiness potential is most pronounced at electrodes near 
the vertex (Cz in the EEG coordinate system), which is directly above the 
medial premotor areas (including the supplementary motor area, SMA, 
1J. R. Searle, Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983).
2H. Kornhuber, and L. Deecke, “Hirnpotentialänderungen bei Willkurbewegungen und 
passiven Bewegungen des Menschen: Bereitschaftspotential und reafferente Potentiale,“ 
Pflügers Archive 284 (1965), pp. 1–17. 
Figure 1. A typical recording of the readiness potential (RP) preceding spontane-
ous movements. The RP is usually recorded at the top of the scalp, above medial 
frontal premotor areas. It gradually ramps up, beginning about 1–2 seconds before 
movement and peaking around the time of movement execution. Figure edited 
and adapted from Haggard and Eimer, 1999.
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pre-supplementary motor area, pre-SMA, and the cingulate motor areas 
below them). It is generally believed that one major source of the readi-
ness potential lies in the medial premotor areas.3
The demonstration of the readiness potential calls into question wheth-
er spontaneous movements are really caused by the preceding conscious 
intentions. Intuitively, conscious intentions seem to cause motor actions 
almost immediately—it seems to take much less time than 1–2 seconds. 
This could mean that the brain starts to prepare for the actions way before 
we consciously initiate them.
Benjamin Libet and colleagues empirically studied the timing of the 
conscious intention in relation to the readiness potential and the action.4 
To measure the onset of conscious intention, he invented a creative but 
controversial paradigm which is sometimes called the “Libet clock para-
digm.” In those studies, subjects watched a dot revolving around a clock 
face at a speed of 2.56 second per cycle, while they flexed their wrist spon-
taneously (see Fig. 2). After the action was finished, subjects were required 
to report the location of the dot when they “first felt the urge” to produce 
the action, i.e., the onset of intention. The subjects might say it was at 3 
3T. Ball et al., “The Role of Higher-order Motor Areas in Voluntary Movement as Re-
vealed by High-resolution EEG and fMRI,” NeuroImage 10 (1999), pp. 682–694. M. Erdler et 
al., “Supplementary Motor Area Activation Preceding Voluntary Movement Is Detectable 
with a Whole-Scalp Magnetoencephalography System,” NeuroImage 11 (2000), pp. 697–707. 
F. Weilke et al., “Time-resolved fMRI of Activation Patterns in M1 and SMA During Complex 
Voluntary Movement,” Journal of Neurophysiology 85 (2001), pp. 1858–1863. R. Cunnington, 
C. Windischberger, L. Deecke, and E. Moser, ”The Preparation and Readiness for Voluntary 
Movement: A High-field Event-related fMRI Study of the Bereitschafts-BOLD Response,” 
NeuroImage 20 (2003), pp. 404–412.
4B. Libet, E. W. Wright, and C. A. Gleason, ”Preparation- or Intention-to-act, in Relation to 
Pre-event Potentials Recorded at the Vertex,” Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiol-
ogy 56 (1983), pp. 367–372.
Figure 2. The Libet clock paradigm. A. The subject views a dot rotating slowly 
(2.56 seconds per cycle) around a clock face and waits for an urge to move to arise 
spontaneously. When the urge arrives, the subject makes a movement (e.g. a key 
press). B. After making the movement, the subject estimates the earliest time at 
which the intention to move was experienced. To carry out this time estimate, the 
subject moves the dot to the position on the clock face corresponding to the time 
when intention was first felt. In a common control condition, the subject uses the 
clock to estimate the time of movement rather than the onset of intention. Figure 
edited and adapted from Lau et al., 2007.
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o’clock or 4 o’clock position when they first felt the intention, for instance. 
This way the subjects could time and report the onset of their intention, 
and the experimenter could then work out actually when the action was 
produced, and hence the temporal distance between the two. Libet and 
colleagues reported that subjects on average report the onset of intention 
to be about 250 ms before major execution.
Many people feel uncomfortable with the fact that the onset of the 
readiness potential seems to be so much earlier than the onset of inten-
tion, and some have tried to explain away the gap. Libet and colleagues 
have tried to study the onset of the readiness potential more carefully, dis-
carding trials which might have been “contaminated” by pre-planning of 
action well before the action, as reported by the subjects. By only looking 
at the trials where the actions were supposed to be genuinely spontane-
ous, Libet and colleagues reported that the onset of the readiness poten-
tial is only about 500 ms before action execution.5 However, this is still 
clearly earlier than the reported onset of intention. And by discarding so 
many trials, it may be that the analysis just lacked the power to detect an 
earlier onset.
Some have argued that the onset of readiness potential might be an ar-
tifact due to the averaging needed to produce the ERP.6 However, Romo 
and Schultz have made recordings from neurons in the medial premo-
tor areas while monkeys made self-paced movements.7 It was found that 
these neurons in fact fired as early as 2.6 seconds before movement onset.
Others have argued that the readiness potential may not reflect the 
specific and causal aspects of motor initiation. However, as mentioned 
earlier, it is likely that the readiness potential largely originates from the 
medial premotor areas. Lesion to these areas can abolish the production of 
spontaneous actions.8 These areas also contain neurons that code specific 
action plans.9 Further, when people use the Libet clock paradigm to time 
their own intentions, there is attentional modulation of activity in the me-
dial pre-SMA, as if people were reading information off the area which is 
likely to be a source of the readiness potential.10
5Ibid.
6J. Miller, and J. A. Trevena. “Cortical Movement Preparation and Conscious Decisions: 
Averaging Artifacts and Timing Biases,” Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2002), pp. 308–313.
7R. Romo, and W. Schultz, “Neuronal Activity Preceding Self-initiated or Externally 
Timed Arm Movements in Area 6 of Monkey Cortex,” Experimental Brain Research. Experi-
mentelle Hirnforschung. Expérimentation cérébrale 67 (1987), pp. 656–662.
8D. Thaler, Y. C. Chen, P. D. Nixon, C. E. Stern, and R. E. Passingham, “The Functions of 
the Medial Premotor Cortex. I. Simple Learned Movements,” Experimental Brain Research. 
Experimentelle Hirnforschung. Expérimentation cérébrale 102 (1995), pp. 445–460.
9J. Tanji, and K. Shima. “Supplementary Motor Cortex in Organization of Movement,” 
European Neurology 36 Supp. 1 (1996), pp. 13–19. K. Shima, and J. Tanji, “Both Supplementary 
and Presupplementary Motor Areas are Crucial for the Temporal Organization of Multiple 
Movements,” Journal of Neurophysiology 80 (1998), pp. 3247–3260.
10H. C. Lau, R. D. Rogers, P. Haggard, and R. E. Passingham, “Attention to Intention,” 
Science 303 (2004), pp. 1208–1210.
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The Libet clock method has also received considerable criticism. It in-
volves timing across modalities, and could be susceptible to various bias-
es.11 However, it is unlikely that all these biases are in the direction that 
would help to narrow the gap between the onsets of the readiness poten-
tial and intention. Some have actually suggested that the different biases 
may point to different directions and thus just cancel each other out.12 
Also, in the original experiments by Libet and colleagues, there were con-
trol conditions that tested for the basic accuracy of the clock. They asked 
subjects to use the clock to time either the onset of movement execution, 
or in another condition to time the onset of tactile stimuli. Since the ac-
tual onsets of these events are objectively measurable, they could estimate 
the subjective error of onset reports produced by the clock method. They 
found the error to be in the order of about 50 ms, i.e., much smaller than 
the gap between the onsets of the readiness potential and intention.
The basic results of Libet and colleagues have also been replicated in 
several different laboratories.13 In general, the same pattern is found, that 
the onset of intention is either around or later than 250 ms before action 
execution, which seems to confirm our intuition that conscious intentions 
seem to be followed by motor actions almost immediately. In fact, given 
that the readiness potential could start as early as 1–2 seconds before 
action execution, it is hard to imagine how the onset of intention could 
coincide or precede the readiness potential, unless one thinks of inten-
tion as a kind of prior intention,14 like the general plan that is formed 
at the beginning of the experimental session when the subject agrees to 
produce some actions in the next half an hour or so. We shall discuss this 
kind of higher-cognitive “intention” later in this paper. However, the in-
tention we are concerned with here is the immediate “urge” to produce 
the motor action.
Taken together, the evidence suggests that conscious intention, i.e., the 
immediate feeling of motor initiation, is unlikely to be the “first unmoved 
mover” in triggering spontaneous motor movements. It is likely to be pre-
ceded by unconscious brain activity that may contribute to action initia-
tion. What, then, is conscious intention for?
11B. Libet, “Unconscious Cerebral Initiative and the Role of Conscious Will in Voluntary 
Action,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1985), pp. 529–566. G. Gomes, “The Interpretation 
of Libet’s Results on the Timing of Conscious Events: A Commentary,” Consciousness and 
Cognition 11 (2002), pp. 221–230; discussion 308–313, 314–325. S. Joordens, M. van Duijn, 
and T. M. Spalek, “When Timing the Mind One Should Also Mind the Timing: Biases in the 
Measurement of Voluntary Actions,” Consciousness and Cognition 11.2 (2002), pp. 231–240; 
discussion 308–313. S. Klein, “Libet’s Research on the Timing of Conscious Intention to Act: 
A Commentary,” Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2002), pp. 273–279; discussion 304–325. J. A. 
Trevena, and J. Miller, “Cortical Movement Preparation Before and After a Conscious Deci-
sion to Move,” Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2002), pp. 162–190; discussion pp. 314–325.
12Klein, “Libet’s Research.” 
13E.g., Lau et al., “Attention to Intention.” P. Haggard, and M. Eimer, “On the Relation 
between Brain Potentials and the Awareness of Voluntary Movements,” Experimental Brain 
Research. Experimentelle Hirnforschung. Expérimentation cérébrale 126 (1999), pp. 128–313.
14J. R. Searle, Intentionality.
542 Faith and Philosophy
2. Conscious Veto?
Libet’s interpretation of the timing-of-intention results is that although in-
tention may not be early enough to be the first cause of action, the fact that 
it is before action execution means that it could still be part of the caus-
al chain. Maybe the decision to move is initiated unconsciously, but the 
awareness of intention may allow us to “veto,” i.e., to cancel the action.
This seems to be a possibility. Libet and colleagues as well as other re-
searchers have performed experiments where subjects prepare for an ac-
tion and then cancel it in the last moment, just before it is executed.15 The 
fact that we have the ability to “veto” an action seems beyond doubt. The 
question, however, is whether having the conscious intention is critical. 
Can the choice of veto be preceded by unconscious activity, just as the in-
tention to act is preceded by the readiness potential? Or are actions some-
times unconsciously vetoed, even without our awareness?
Some recent evidence suggests that the conscious intention may not 
facilitate a veto. As mentioned earlier, when people were using the Libet 
clock to time the onset of their intentions, there was attentional modula-
tion of activity in the pre-SMA. These data have been subsequently further 
analyzed, and it has been shown that subjects who showed large degree 
of attentional modulation tended to also report the onset of intention to be 
early.16 One interpretation could be that attention biases the judgment of 
onset to be earlier. It was found in another experiment that this was also 
true when people used the Libet clock to time the onset of the motor ex-
ecution. The higher the level of fMRI activity modulated by attention, the 
earlier subjects reported the onset to be, even though on average subjects 
reported the onsets to be earlier than they actually were, which means a 
bias to the negative (i.e., early) direction produced more erroneous rather 
more precise reports. In general, the principle of attentional prior entry17 
suggests that attention to an event speeds up its perception and negatively 
biases the reported onset. If this were true in the case of the Libet experi-
ments, this could mean that attention might have exaggerated the 250 ms 
onset, i.e., had subjects not been required to attend to their intentions in 
order to perform the timing tasks, the true onset of conscious intention 
may well be much later than 250 ms prior to action execution. This calls 
into question whether we have enough time to consider the veto.
Another study reported that some patients with lesion to the parietal 
cortex reported the onset of intention to be as late as 50 ms prior to action 
execution.18 If the awareness of intention allows one to veto actions, one 
15Libet et al., “Preparation- or Intention-to-act.” M. Brass, and P. Haggard, “To Do or Not to 
Do: The Neural Signature of Self-control,” The Journal of Neuroscience 27 (2007), pp. 9141–9145.
16H. C. Lau, R. D. Rogers, and R. E. Passingham, “On Measuring the Perceived Onsets of 
Spontaneous Actions,” The Journal of Neuroscience 26 (2006), pp. 7265–7271.
17D. I. Shore, C. Spence, and R. M. Klein, “Visual Prior Entry,” Psychological Science 12 
(2001), pp. 205–212.
18A. Sirigu et al., “Altered Awareness of Voluntary Action after Damage to the Parietal 
Cortex,” Nature Neuroscience 7 (2004), pp. 80–84.
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might expect these patients to have much less time to consciously evaluate 
spontaneous intentions and cancel the inappropriate ones. This could be 
quite disastrous to daily life functioning. Yet there were no such reports 
about these patients.
Finally, in another study, single pulses of transcranial magnetic stimu-
lation (TMS) were sent to the medial premotor areas (targeting the pre-
SMA).19 Again, subjects were instructed to produce spontaneous move-
ments and to time the onset of intentions and movement execution us-
ing the Libet clock. Surprisingly, although TMS was applied after motor 
execution, it has an effect on the reported onsets. No matter whether TMS 
was applied immediately after action execution or with a 200 ms delay, the 
stimulation exaggerated the temporal distance between the reported on-
sets of intention and movement, as if people reported a prolonged period 
of conscious intending. One interpretation may be that TMS injected noisy 
activity into the area and the intention monitoring mechanism did not 
distinguish this from endogenously generated activity that is supposed to 
represent intention. However, what is crucial is the fact that the reported 
onsets can be manipulated even after the action is finished. This seems to 
suggest that our awareness of intention may be constructed after the facts, 
or at least not completely determined before the action is finished. If con-
scious intentions are not formed before the action, they certainly cannot 
play any role in facilitating veto, let alone causing it.
This interpretation may seem wild, but it is consistent with other pro-
posals. . For instance, Wegner has suggested that maybe the conscious will 
is an illusion.20 The sense of agency is often inferred post hoc, based on 
many contextual factors. Wegner cites experiments to support these claims. 
One example is a study on “facilitated communication.”21 Subjects (play-
ing the role of “facilitators”) were asked to place their fingers on two keys 
of a keyboard, while a confederate (playing the role of “communicator”) 
placed his or her fingers on top of those of the subject. Subjects were given 
headphones with which they listened to questions of varying difficulty. 
Confederates were given headphones as well, and subjects were led to be-
lieve that the confederates would be hearing the same questions, although 
in fact the confederates heard nothing. Subjects were told to detect subtle, 
unconscious movements in the confederate’s fingers following each ques-
tion. When such movements were detected, the subject should press the 
corresponding key in order to answer on the confederate’s behalf. It was 
found that subjects answered easy questions well above chance levels. If 
they had performed the task strictly according to the instructions, however, 
they should have performed at chance. Therefore, subjects must have been 
directing their own key presses. Nonetheless, they attributed a significant 
19H. C. Lau, R. D. Rogers, and R. E. Passingham, “Manipulating the Experienced Onset of 
Intention after Action Execution,” Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 19 (2007), pp. 81–90.
20D. M. Wegner, The Illusion of Conscious Will (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2002).
21D. M. Wegner, V. A. Fuller, and B. Sparrow, “Clever Hands: Uncontrolled Intelligence in 
Facilitated Communication,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 85 (2003), pp. 5–19.
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causal role for the key presses to the confederate. The degree to which sub-
jects answered easy questions correctly was not correlated with the degree 
to which they attributed causal responsibility to confederates, suggesting 
that the generation of action and attribution of action to an agent are inde-
pendent processes.
To summarize, although theorists have speculated that the awareness 
of intention may play some role in allowing us to cancel or edit our ac-
tions, considerable doubt has been cast by recent empirical evidence.
3. Exclusion and Inhibition
Another kind of situation that seems to require conscious deliberation in-
volves the need to avoid a particular action or response. This is related 
to “vetoing” as described above, except that the action being inhibited is 
not necessarily self-paced, and may be specified externally. One example 
would be to perform stem completion while avoiding a particular word. 
So for instance, the experimenter may ask the subjects to produce any 
word starting with letter D (i.e., completing a ‘stem’), but avoid the word 
‘dinner.’ So subjects can produce ‘dog,’ ‘danger,’ ‘dear,’ etc., but if they 
produce the word ‘dinner,’ it would be counted as an error. This is called 
the exclusion task.22
One interesting aspect of the exclusion task is that people can perform 
well only if they clearly perceive and remember the target of exclusion 
(i.e., the word ‘dinner’ in the foregoing example). If the target of exclusion 
is presented very briefly and followed by a mask, such that it was only 
very weakly perceived, people may fail to exclude it.23 In fact, they tend to 
produce exactly the word they should be avoiding with higher likelihood 
than if they were not presented with the word at all. It has been argued 
that this exclusion failure phenomenon is the hallmark of unconscious 
processing.24 The weak perception of the target probably produced a rep-
resentation for the word, but because the signal was not strong enough to 
reach the level of conscious processing, we are unable to inhibit the cor-
responding response.
In addition to the intuitive appeal, the notion that consciousness is 
required for exclusion is also supported by a case study of a blindsight 
patient.25 Subject GY has a lesion to the left primary visual cortex (V1), and 
reports that most of his right visual field is subjectively blind. However, 
in a forced-choice situation he can discriminate simple stimuli well above 
22L. L. Jacoby, D. S. Lindsay, and J. P. Toth, “Unconscious Influences Revealed. Attention, 
Awareness, and Control,” The American Psychologist 47 (1992), pp. 802–809.
23 J. A. Debner, and L. L. Jacoby, “Unconscious Perception: Attention, Awareness, and 
Control,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 20 (1994), pp. 
304–317. P. M. Merikle, S. Joordens, and J. A. Stolz, “Measuring the Relative Magnitude of 
Unconscious Influences,” Consciousness and Cognition 4 (1995), pp. 422–349.
24Jacoby et al., “Unconscious Influences Revealed.”
25N. Persaud, and A. Cowey, “Blindsight is Unlike Normal Conscious Vision: Evidence 
from an Exclusion Task,” Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2007), pp. 1050–1055.
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chance level in his “blind” field.26 In one study he was required to perform 
an exclusion task, i.e., to say the location (up or down) where the target 
was not presented.27 Whereas he could do this easily in the normal field, he 
failed the task when stimuli were presented to his blind field. Note that he 
did significantly worse than chance in the blind field, as if the unconscious 
signal drove the response directly and inflexibly, defying exclusion con-
trol. This seems to support the conclusion that consciousness is required 
for exclusion.
The general idea that inhibition requires consciousness seems to be 
supported by other studies too, including those that do not employ the 
exclusion paradigm. One study tested subjects’ ability to ignore distract-
ing moving dots, while doing a central task that has nothing to do with 
the distractors.28 It was found that if the motion of the distractor was above 
the perceptual threshold, people could ignore the dots and inhibit the 
distraction successfully. Somewhat paradoxically, when the motion was 
below perceptual threshold, people could not ignore the dots and were 
distracted. The results from brain imaging seem to suggest that when the 
motion of the stimuli was strong, it activated the prefrontal cortex, and 
triggered it to suppress the motion signal. When the motion of the stimuli 
was below perceptual threshold, however, the signal failed to trigger the 
inhibitory functions in the prefrontal cortex, and therefore the motion sig-
nal was not suppressed and thus remained distracting.
However, the notion that flexible control or inhibition of perceptual 
signal requires consciousness is not without its critics.29 One problem 
becomes clear when we consider the motion distractor example above. 
“Conscious signal” here seems to be the same thing as a strong signal, 
driven by larger motion strength in the stimuli. Obviously, signals have to 
be strong enough to reach the prefrontal cortex in order to trigger the as-
sociating executions functions. Do unconscious stimuli fail to be excluded 
because we are not conscious of them, or is it just because the signal is not 
strong enough? Or, are the two explanations one and the same? We will 
come back to this issue in the final section of this paper.
Other researchers have reported evidence that seems to support un-
conscious inhibition. For instance, in one study people were asked to 
26L. Weiskrantz, Blindsight: A Case Study and Implications (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1986). L. Weiskrantz, Consciousness Lost and Found: A Neuropsychological Exploration (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1997).
27Persaud and Cowey, “Blindsight.”
28Y. Tsushima, Y. Sasaki, and T. Watanabe, “Greater Disruption Due to Failure of Inhibi-
tory Control on an Ambiguous Distractor,” Science 314 (2006), pp. 1786–1788.
29M. Snodgrass, “Disambiguating Conscious and Unconscious Influences: Do Exclusion 
Paradigms Demonstrate Unconscious Perception?” The American Journal of Psychology 115 
(2002), pp. 545–579. S. J. Haase, and G. Fisk, “Confidence in Word Detection Predicts Word 
Identification: Implications for an Unconscious Perception Paradigm,” The American Journal 
of Psychology 114 (2001), pp. 439–68. T. A. Visser, and P. M. Merikle, “Conscious and Un-
conscious Processes: The Effects of Motivation,” Consciousness and Cognition 8 (1999), pp. 
94–113.
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detect visually presented words.30 In certain conditions, some sub-
jects showed detection performance that was significantly worse than 
chance. These words were presented so briefly that typically detection 
performance would be near chance. We usually take chance-level as 
the objective threshold for conscious perception. Below chance-level 
performance could be taken as evidence that the subjects did not con-
sciously perceive the words. And yet, if they had no information at all 
regarding the words, performance should just be exactly at chance rath-
er than below. It seems that these subjects were actively suppressing 
the words.
These are unusual cases and are somewhat hard to interpret. We take 
chance-level as the objective threshold for conscious perception because 
when people perform at chance, it indicates that they do not have the ex-
plicit information regarding the target of perception. However, if people 
perform significantly below chance, it means that somehow they have 
the information regarding the detection, which violates the very logic we 
adopt to label perception unconscious. But in any case, the stimuli were 
supposed to be really weak, and it is intriguing that some subjects seem to 
be automatically suppressing the words. Are we to take these somewhat 
unusual cases as evidence to reject the notion that exclusion or inhibition 
requires consciousness? It seems that, logically, if we claim that a certain 
function requires consciousness, we should predict there will never be a 
case where one could perform such function unconsciously. How seriously 
are we to take this logic and reject functions as requiring consciousness by 
a single experiment? We will return to this argument in the last section of 
the paper.
4. Top-down Cognitive Control
So far we have discussed acts of volition that are relatively simple, like 
starting a motor movement, or avoiding a particular action. Sometimes we 
also voluntarily prepare for a set of rules or action plans in order to satisfy 
a more abstract goal. For instance, a telephone ring may usually trigger 
a particular action, e.g., to pick up the phone. However, when one visits 
friends at their homes, one may deliberately change the mapping between 
the stimulus (telephone ring) and action, i.e., it would be more appropri-
ate to sit still, or ask the host to pick up the phone, rather than picking it 
up yourself. This volitional change of stimulus-response contingency is an 
example of top-down cognitive control.
It has been suggested that top-down cognitive control may require 
consciousness.31 The idea is that unconscious stimuli can trigger certain 
30M. Snodgrass, and H.  Shevrin, “Unconscious Inhibition and Facilitation at the Objec-
tive Detection Threshold: Replicable and Qualitatively Different Unconscious Perceptual Ef-
fects,” Cognition 101 (2006), pp. 43–79.
31S. Dehaene, and L. Naccache, “Towards a Cognitive Neuroscience of Consciousness: 
Basic Evidence and a Workspace Framework,” Cognition 79 (2001), pp. 1–37.
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prepared actions, as demonstrated in studies in subliminal priming.32 
However, the preparation or setting up of the stimulus-response contin-
gency may require consciousness.
However, recent studies suggest that this might not be true, in the 
sense that unconscious information seems to be able to influence or even 
trigger top-down cognitive control too.33 In one study subjects had to pre-
pare to do a phonological or semantic judgment, based on the orientation 
of a figure they saw (see Fig. 3). In every trial, if they saw a square, they 
32S. Kouider, and S. Dehaene, “Levels of Processing During Non-conscious Perception: A 
Critical Review of Visual Masking,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. 
Series B, Biological Sciences 362 (2007), pp. 857–875.
33U. Mattler, “Priming of Mental Operations by Masked Stimuli,” Perception and Psy-
chophysics 65 (2003), pp. 167–187. H. C. Lau, and R. E. Passingham, “Unconscious Activation 
of the Cognitive Control System in the Human Prefrontal Cortex,” The Journal of Neuroscience 
27 (2007), pp. 5805–5811.
Figure 3. Experimental paradigm of Lau and Passingham (2007). Subjects view 
briefly presented words and perform either a phonological task (is the word one 
syllable or two syllables?) or a semantic task (does the word name something con-
crete or abstract?). Before word presentation, subjects are instructed which task to 
perform on a given trial by a visual symbol (a square for the phonological task, or 
a diamond for the semantic task). The symbolic instruction itself acts as a metacon-
trast mask for an earlier prime, also a square or a diamond. Because the prime is 
briefly presented and masked, it is not consciously perceived. On half of trials, the 
prime is congruent with the instruction and on the other half, incongruent. Behav-
ioral and imaging results suggest that the unconscious primes affected top-down 
task switching. When primes were incongruent with instructions, accuracy fell, 
reaction time increased, and brain regions corresponding to the task indicated by 
the prime were partially activated (all relative to the prime-congruent condition). 
But when the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between prime and instruction 
was lowered, such that primes became visible, the priming effect was not evident. 
This double dissociation suggests that the interference of incongruent primes on 
task switching cannot be attributed to conscious processing. Figure adapted from 
Lau and Passingham, “Unconscious Activation.”
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had to prepare to judge whether an upcoming word has two syllables 
(e.g., “table”) or not (e.g., “milk”). If they saw a diamond, they had to 
prepare to judge whether an upcoming word refers to a concrete object 
(e.g., “chair”) or an abstract idea (e.g., “love”). In other words, they had 
to perform top-down cognitive control based on the instruction figure 
(square or diamond). However, before the instruction figure was present-
ed, there was actually an invisible prime figure, which could also be a 
diamond or a square. It was found that the prime could impair subjects’ 
performance when it suggested the alternative (i.e., wrong) task to the 
subjects. One could argue that this was only because the prime distracted 
the subjects on a perceptual level, and did not really trigger cognitive 
control. However, the experiment was performed in the fMRI scanner, 
and the brain recordings suggest that when being primed to perform the 
wrong task, subjects used more of the wrong neural resources too.34 That 
is, areas that are more sensitive to phonological or semantic processing 
showed increased activity when the explicit instruction figure made sub-
jects perform the phonological and semantic tasks respectively. The in-
visible primes also seem to be able to trigger activations in task sensitive 
areas. This seems to suggest that they can influence or exercise top-down 
cognitive control.
Another study examines how unconscious information affects our 
high-level objectives by focusing on how the potential reward influenc-
es our level of motivation.35 Subjects squeezed a device to win a certain 
amount of money. The harder they squeezed, the more money they would 
win. However, the size of the stake in question for a particular trial was 
announced in the beginning by presenting the photo of a coin. The coin 
could either be a British pound (~2 US dollars) or a penny (~2 US cents), 
and it signified the monetary value of the maximal reward for that trial. 
Not surprisingly, people squeezed harder when the stakes were high, but 
interestingly, the same pattern of behavior was observed even when the 
figure of the coin was masked such that subjects reported not seeing it. 
This suggests that unconscious information can influence our level of mo-
tivation as well.
If unconscious information alone is sufficient to exercise all these so-
phisticated top-down control functions, why do we need to be conscious 
at all?
5. How to Find the True Function of Consciousness
The foregoing is not meant to be an exhaustive review of all studies on 
the potential functions of consciousness. We have selected some examples 
from a few areas that are particularly related to volition, and discussed 
34Lau and Passingham, “Unconscious Activation.”
35M. Pessiglione et al., “How the Brain Translates Money Into Force: A Neuroimaging 
Study of Subliminal Motivation,” Science 316 (2007), pp. 904–906.
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what role consciousness may play. It may, of course, be that there are oth-
er psychological functions that require consciousness.
Yet, one cannot help but feel that there seems to be some inherent limi-
tation to this whole enterprise of research. If we claim that a certain func-
tion requires consciousness, we are making the claim that the function 
should never be able to be performed unconsciously. In principle, it would 
only take a single experiment to falsify that. This explains why this review 
may seem biased in that we focus on studies that show the power of the 
unconscious, rather than studies demonstrating what functions definitely 
require consciousness. In principle, falsifying the claim that a certain func-
tion requires consciousness is straightforward. But this is not the case for 
demonstrating functions that do require consciousness.
One can of course try to show that subjects could normally do a task if 
the relevant information is consciously perceived. And then one tries to 
‘knock-out’ the conscious perception for such information, and try to show 
that the task could no longer be performed. But how would one know that 
in ‘knocking-out’ the conscious perception, one does not ‘knock-out’ too 
much? One typically suppresses conscious perception by visual masking, 
by using brief presentation, by distracting the subject, by applying tran-
scranial magnetic stimulation, by pharmacological manipulations, etc. 
But all of these could potentially impair the unconscious as well as the 
conscious signal. Maybe in cases where the perception has been rendered 
unconscious, the signal is just no longer strong enough to drive the func-
tion in question? This would mean that, in principle, it would be possible 
for a future study to find the optimal procedure or setup to just render the 
information unconscious, without reducing the signal strength too much. 
And in that case the subjects may be able to perform the task in question. 
That would falsify our claim.
This means that in looking for functions that require consciousness, 
we need to adopt some different strategies. One potentially useful ap-
proach is to try to demonstrate something akin to a “double dissociation.” 
When conscious perception is suppressed, we often find that a sophisti-
cated function (e.g., top-down cognitive control) can no longer be per-
formed, though some simpler function (e.g., priming for a prepared mo-
tor response) may still be activated by unconscious information. From 
the foregoing discussion, one could see that this may not be as surprising 
or informative as it seems. It could be just that the unconscious signal 
is too weak to drive the relatively sophisticated function. A demonstra-
tion of the opposite would, however, be much more convincing: If af-
ter suppression of conscious perception, the subjects can still perform a 
rather sophisticated function, but fail to perform a simple function, that 
would suggest that the simple function really requires consciousness. In 
this case, it could not be that the suppression of conscious perception has 
taken away too much of the signal strength, because if that were the case 
then the subjects should not be able to perform the relatively sophisti-
cated function (see Fig. 4).
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An alternative approach may be to directly match for signal strength 
between the conscious and the unconscious conditions. This might seem 
radically difficult because conscious signals may seem to be strong in gen-
eral. However, as discussed above, blindsight subjects can perform forced-
choice discrimination on visual stimuli well above chance, even when they 
claim that conscious awareness is missing. Forced-choice performance is 
often taken as an objective estimate of signal strength; the detection theo-
retical measure d’ is mathematically just the signal-to-noise ratio. In blind-
sight subject GY, where only half of the visual field lacks awareness, we 
can imagine presenting weak stimuli to the normal visual field such that 
forced-choice performance would match that in the blind field.36 This way 
we can test if certain functions cannot be performed based on information 
presented to the blind field, which may shed light on when consciousness 
is required.
One may argue that blindsight patients are rare and the way their 
brains process visual information may not be generalizable to intact 
brains. However, there are other paradigms where in normal subjects 
one could match for forced-choice performance, and yet produce a differ-
36L. Weiskrantz, J. L. Barbur, and A. Sahraie, “Parameters Affecting Conscious versus Un-
conscious Visual Discrimination With Damage to the Visual Cortex (V1),” Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 92 (1995), pp. 6122–6126.
Figure 4. (a) The normal situation for conscious perception. Stimuli are strong 
enough to drive processes of different complexity. (b) A typical situation for un-
conscious perception. Stimuli are weak such that complicated processes are no 
longer activated, though simple processes can still be triggered. It could be argued 
that this is not surprising as we may expect that complicated processes require a 
stronger signal. (c) A potentially more informative situation. If one could find a 
stimulus that is not consciously perceived, but yet is sufficiently strong to trigger a 
complicated process, then the relatively simple process that the stimulus does not 
drive would seem to critically depend on consciousness.
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ence in the level of conscious awareness. For instance, in one study meta-
contrast masking was used to create similar conditions where forced-
choice discrimination accuracy for the visual targets was matched, and 
yet the subjective reports of how often subjects saw the identity of the 
Figure 5. Inducing “relative blindsight” in normal observers using metacontrast 
masking. A. Metacontrast masking paradigm. The subject is presented with a vi-
sual target (in this case, either a square or diamond). Afterwards, a metacontrast 
mask is presented. The mask differentially affects discrimination accuracy and 
visual awareness of the target as a function of stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA). 
B.  Discrimination accuracy and visual awareness as a function of metacontrast 
mask SOA. The metacontrast mask creates a characteristic U-shaped function 
of performance vs. SOA. At shorter and longer SOAs, discrimination accuracy 
is high, but it dips at intermediate SOAs. The same is true for visual awareness, 
but the shape of the awareness masking function is not perfectly symmetrical 
with respect to the performance masking function. That is, there are certain 
SOAs at which forced choice performance is matched, but visual awareness dif-
fers significantly (e.g. as illustrated in the SOAs of 33 ms and 100 ms in fig 5B). 
Such performance-matched conditions could be used to investigate the func-
tions of consciousness. If some task can be performed better in the condition of 
higher subjective visibility, it can plausibly be said to require visual awareness. 
Because forced-choice discrimination accuracy is matched across the two condi-
tions, the superior performance of the task in the high visibility condition cannot 
be attributed to a difference in signal strength. Figure adapted from Lau and 
Passingham, “Relative Blindsight.”
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targets differed (see Fig. 5).37 One could imagine presenting these stimuli 
to subjects and seeing if they drive a certain function with different effec-
tiveness. If the subjects perform better in the condition where subjective 
conscious awareness of the stimuli is more frequent, one could argue that 
this function is likely to depend critically on consciousness.
6. Conclusion
Acts of volition are accompanied by a sense of conscious effort or inten-
tion. The fact that we feel the conscious effort is not in doubt. What is less 
clear is whether the processes underlying the conscious experience directly 
contribute to the execution of the actions in a way that is not accomplished 
by unconscious processes just as effectively. The general picture seems to 
be that many sophisticated functions can be performed unconsciously or 
driven by unconscious information.
Does this mean that consciousness has no special function at all? The 
answer is not yet clear. It is likely that some psychological functions do 
require consciousness, i.e., can never be performed unconsciously, but ex-
periments have not yet been able to convincingly pin them down.
They will have to overcome the following problem. If we assume that 
conscious perception is always accompanied by stronger and longer-last-
ing signals that are more effective than unconscious signals in propagat-
ing themselves throughout the brain, then certainly, consciousness would 
have the functions of these strong signals. However in studies of blind-
sight38 as well as in normals39 it has been shown that signal strength as 
indicated by forced-choice performance is not always one and the same as 
conscious awareness. Therefore, future studies may need to focus on iden-
tifying the functions that really cannot be performed unconsciously, even 
when the signal strength is sufficiently strong. This may help to reveal the 
true function of consciousness.
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